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THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT AND GLOBAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
FREDERICK M. ABBOTT*
The global system for the protection of intellectual property
rights has entered a new era. The Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement") that is
part of the new integrated World Trade Organization (WTO) system
imposes on all Members of the WTO an obligation to establish high
levels of intellectual property rights ("IPRs") protection, and to en-
force these high levels of protection.' The TRIPS Agreement, when
read in conjunction with other components of the new WTO system, is
enforceable by WTO Member action through the imposition of trade
sanctions. 2
I. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT ERA
The TRIPS Agreement was concluded after seven years of Uru-
guay Round negotiations, several years of negotiations leading up to
the Uruguay Round mandate, and earlier discussions of an anti-
counterfeiting code tracing back to the Tokyo Round negotiations. 3
As one of the principal multilateral trade agreements of the WTO, the
TRIPS Agreement plays a new and important role in the international
economic system. The Agreement was intended to conclude the era
of global intellectual property administration under the auspices of
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agree-
ment], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M.
81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. The TRIPS Agreement entered into force on Janu-
ary 1, 1995. See id. Regarding the terms of the Agreement, see generally Adrian Otten. Improv-
ing the Playing Field for Exports: The Agreements on Intellectual Property, Investment Measures
and Government Procurement, in GATT URUGUAY ROUND 67 (Thomas Cottier ed., 1995); J.H.
Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS
Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345 (1995).
2. With respect to the application of the TRIPS Agreement in the dispute settlement con-
text, and to the imposition of trade sanctions, see Frederick M. Abbott, WTO Dispute Settlement
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects "of Intellectual Property Rights, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW AND THE GATT-WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (E.-U. Petersmann ed.)
(forthcoming 1997).
3. With respect to the negotiating history and objectives of the TRIPS Agreement, see
Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property Ne-
gotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1989).
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the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) which the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD")
industrial interests perceived as insufficiently forceful, and to initiate a
new era of shared competence. In the new era, the primary rules gov-
erning the protection of intellectual property would be promulgated at
the WTO. WIPO would step back into a secondary role. It would
serve as an IPRs convention administrator, as a provider of technical
assistance, and as a forum for considering secondary rules changes.
The center of IPRs power, and the police function, would move across
Geneva to the WTO.
The IPRs-dependent industries of the OECD countries cannot be
faulted for pursuing the TRIPS Agreement. The value of their assets
is to a greater and lesser extent defined by the level of protection ac-
corded to IPRs. The importance of IPRs as a component of asset
value varies across industrial and service sectors, and within narrow
industry segments. Natural resources and access to capital are the
principal asset components in many industries, such as the petroleum
industry, and the value of IPRs is secondary in these industries. In
other industries, such as the entertainment industry, IPRs are princi-
pal components of asset value. While the importance of IPRs to each
OECD industry in 1996 may vary along a relative scale, there are few
industries in which IPRs do not play a significant role. Farmers have
become dependent on the planting of IPRs-protected seed strains, and
are increasingly interested in the production of genetically-engineered
produce.
OECD industries claim entitlement to the fruits of their innova-
tive activity in the form of IPRs protection. Debate over the basis of
this entitlement traces to the historical beginnings of IPRs protection,
and is not a debate that will be resolved in this forum. To some, IPRs
are a right of nature, as the ownership of one's own limbs, or one's
home. To others, IPRs are purely the product of government.
Whatever the fundamental basis of IPRs ownership, it has long been
accepted that the scope of the IPR must be defined by government,
under a public welfare analysis that balances the interests of IPRs
owners and the public, just as government decides the extent of own-
ership rights afforded by title to land. It should not be doubted that
perspectives on the scope of the rights that governments should afford
to IPRs have varied over history, and among societies, just as have
perspectives on the ownership of real property.
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A. Developing Country Interests in the TRIPS Negotiations
It was certainly recognized during the Uruguay Round TRIPS ne-
gotiations that the proposed agreement would have an impact on the
interests of developing countries.4 Many developing countries did not
historically provide high levels of IPRs protection within their na-
tional legal systems. If. as a consequence of the TRIPS negotiations,
those countries agreed to provide such protection, and if the IPRs to
be protected were preponderantly held by OECD country enterprises,
then the recognition of IP ownership rights would logically lead to a
transfer of wealth from the developing to industrialized economies, at
least over the short term. There was, and is, substantial agreement
concerning this likely short term impact.5 The developing countries
initially resisted negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement because they
foresaw this economically undesirable outcome.
In the final analysis, the developing countries accepted the
TRIPS Agreement. There were doubtless a variety of reasons for the
change in perspective that took place over the course of the Uruguay
Round, and different developing countries involved in the negotia-
tions would have had different motivations for accepting the Agree-
ment. Nevertheless, it is clear that the TRIPS Agreement was part of
a package bargain.
The bargain included an agreement by the industrialized coun-
tries to reduce levels of agricultural export subsidies. This was of par-
ticular importance with respect to the European Union which
provides massive subsidies for its farmers' exports of important staple
crops such as wheat. The EU subsidies allow its farmers to undercut
the prices of developing country farmers, and thereby diminish devel-
oping country export opportunities. The United States agreed to
press the EU for concessions on agricultural subsidies, at least partly
in exchange for developing country acceptance of the TRIPS Agree-
ment. In addition to concessions on subsidies, the industrialized coun-
tries made substantial concessions with respect to imports of tropical
products, and agreed to gradually phase out quotas on textile
products.
In the TRIPS Agreement itself there are some important conces-
sions to developing country interests. Most importantly, substantial
4. The developing country perspective on the TRIPS Agreement is discussed in Abbott,
supra note 3, at 713-14.
5. See, e.g., Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Economic Justification for the
Grant of Intellectual Property Rights: Patterns of Convergence and Conflict, 72 CH.-KENT L.
REv. 439 (1996).
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transition periods are built into the Agreement, so that most obliga-
tions will not apply to developing country Members (and Members in
transition from centrally-planned to market economies) until five
years after the WTO Agreement has entered into force. 6 In respect to
countries that did not maintain patent protection for all areas covered
by the TRIPS Agreement, there is an additional five-year period to
extend product patent protection to new areas.7 This additional five-
year patent transition period is tempered with respect to pharmaceuti-
cals and agricultural chemicals by a so-called "mailbox" provision.8 A
ten-year transition period generally applies to the least developed
WTO Members. 9 Industrialized country Members agree to provide
incentives for their enterprises to transfer technology to least-devel-
oped Members, 10 and to provide-on mutually agreeable terms-fi-
nancial and technical assistance to developing and least-developed
Members.11 Rules with respect to the granting of compulsory licenses
leave substantial discretion in the hands of national authorities. 12 The
United States, at least, would have preferred tighter limits on the
granting of compulsory licenses. The compulsory licensing provisions
at least in part represent a concession to developing country interests.
Up to and through the Uruguay Round negotiations, the United
States pursued an aggressive trade policy toward developing countries
which it considered not to be adequately protecting U.S. IPRs inter-
ests.' 3 One of the motivations of the developing countries in ac-
cepting the TRIPS Agreement was to ameliorate this constant
pressure from the United States. The WTO Agreement includes a
commitment by Members to use the WTO dispute settlement mecha-
nism as the means to settle trade disputes within the scope of the
WTO Agreement (including the TRIPS Agreement). 14 Thus, there is
6. See TRIPS Agreement art. 65:2. The general obligation of WTO Members to apply
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement did not arise until January 1, 1996 (one year after the date
of entry into force of the WTO Agreement). See id. art. 65:1. Provisions regarding national and
most favored nation treatment, and respect for the Paris and Berne Conventions, also apply to
developing Members one year after entry into force of the Agreement.
7. See id. art. 65:4.
8. The mailbox provision requires developing Members to expeditiously establish a mech-
anism for receiving patent applications, to eventually grant patents based upon prior art in exist-
ence when the application is filed, and to grant exclusive marketing rights for the product
following regulatory approval (for a period not to exceed five years). See id. art. 70:8-9.
9. See id. art. 66:1.
10. See id. art. 66:2.
11. See id. art. 67.
12. See id. art. 31.
13. See Frederick M. Abbott, Public Policy and Global Technological Integration: An Intro-
duction, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 345, 346 n.3 (1996).
14. See WTO Agreement art. 23 (Dispute Settlement Understanding).
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the appearance of a bargain between the United States and the devel-
oping countries: if they abide by their TRIPS Agreement commit-
ments, the United States will not unilaterally decide that they are
failing to live up to their international obligations and impose trade
sanctions. '5
Finally, it is certainly possible that the Uruguay Round would
have failed as a whole if the TRIPS Agreement was not accepted by
the developing countries. This would have had an adverse impact on
all countries. Nevertheless, the developing countries could have ill af-
forded the potential result of more restricted access to major industri-
alized markets. The general advantages that would result from a
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round were thus an inducement
to acceptance of the TRIPS Agreement.
15. Though not directly TRIPS Agreement-related, a unilateral U.S. action against Japan
(regarding its automotive sector) immediately following entry into force of the WTO Agreement
raised considerable concern about the nature of the Uruguay Round bargain. The United States
ignored prescribed WTO dispute settlement procedures in a highly visible way, and authorized
the imposition of trade sanctions against Japan contrary to WTO rules. For background regard-
ing the U.S.-Japan dispute, see U.S., Japan Strike Deal on Autos; Address Parts, Dealerships,
Repairs, 12 Int'l Tr. Rep. (BNA) 11 (July 5, 1995). The United States appeared to serve notice
that it might well ignore a principal concession bargained for by the developing countries in the
Uruguay Round negotiations; that is, an assurance that it would not unilaterally decide upon
violations of international trade law (or find other trade practices "unreasonable") and thereaf-
ter impose trade sanctions. Going into the negotiations, perhaps the sorest spot for the develop-
ing countries was the unilateral U.S. pursuit of trade sanctions with respect to IPRs-related
practices. In acting unilaterally against Japan, the United States signalled an apparent willing-
ness to continue aggressive unilateral action against other WTO Members, including those which
it considered to be inadequately protecting IPRs. Since its action against Japan in respect to the
automotive sector, the United States has pursued several complaints regarding TRIPS Agree-
ment matters within the WTO framework. It may be that the negative worldwide reaction to the
action against Japan persuaded U.S. trade officials that policy could be more effectively carried
out within the framework built during the Uruguay Round negotiations. Nevertheless, the U.S.
Congress has legislatively authorized the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") to im-
pose TRIPS Agreement-related trade sanctions on WTO Members which are in compliance with
the TRIPS Agreement, in essence codifying an aggressive unilateral approach to assuring protec-
tion of IPRs. In connection with implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements, the United
States amended its section 301 legislation to provide that "unreasonable" foreign country acts,
policies or practices include those which deny "fair and equitable ... provision of adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights notwithstanding the fact that the foreign coun-
try may be in compliance with the specific obligations of the Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property .... " 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994) (section 301(d)(3)(B)). That the
United States may impose trade sanctions on a WTO Member despite its compliance with the
TRIPS Agreement is difficult to reconcile with the spirit of the WTO Agreement. Presumably,
the United States would intend to apply this rule to matters outside the scope of the TRIPS
Agreement.
"Unreasonable" foreign country acts and practices provide the basis for discretionary action
by USTR, whereas unlawful or "unjustifiable" practices entail a mandatory response (though
subject to significant exceptions).
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B. Continuing Uncertainties
Some attention was paid to the interests of developing countries
in the TRIPS Agreement negotiating process. There remains, how-
ever, little doubt that the driving force behind the negotiations was
OECD country industry groups that perceived a significant and grow-
ing threat to their valuable commercial assets represented and pro-
tected by IPRs. During the Uruguay Round negotiations, these
groups devoted their efforts to assembling data intended to demon-
strate the extent of this threat. They also promoted the idea that
higher levels of IPRs protection would be in the best interests of the
developing countries. The arguments are by now quite familiar: (1)
OECD countries have high levels of IPRs protection; (2) OECD in-
dustries are very innovative; (3) if developing countries adopt high
levels of IPRs, their industries will be very innovative; (4) if develop-
ing countries do not adopt high levels of IPRs, their scientists and
other innovators will leave because they will not be adequately re-
warded for their innovation; and (5) if developing countries do not
adopt high levels of IPRs, then industrialized country IPRs-holders
will not transfer technology to them.16
By way of contrast, a recent study under United Nations auspices
sought to determine what correlation there had been between devel-
oping countries that grant high levels of IPRs protection and the level
of foreign investment,17 the assumption being that increased foreign
investment stimulates economic development. This study found an
absence of correlation. The developing countries that have received
the highest levels of Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI") over the past
decade were the same countries that appeared on the USTR's list of
the worst IPRs violators - Argentina, Brazil, North Korea, the Peo-
ple's Republic of China ("PRC"), Thailand, etc.18 Moreover, devel-
oping countries without other strong economic attractions, but which
16. The Uruguay Round negotiations generated a particular form of economic analysis of
the relationship between IPRs and economic development: the "industry-" or "quasi-industry-
sponsored" study. These were studies by lawyers and economists working with a consultancy or
similar industry interest in the outcome of the work, that set out in advance to demonstrate the
benefits to developing countries of enhanced levels of IPRs protection. See, e.g., INTELLECrUAL
PROPERTY RiGHrs: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CorNFIcr? (R.M. Gadbaw & T. Richards
eds., 1988); Robert Sherwood, The Benefits Developing Countries Gain from Safeguarding In-
tellectual Property (June 1988) (manuscript cited in Abbott, supra note 3, at 693 n.16).
17. See U.N. Transnational Corps. & Management Div., Dep't of Econs. & Soc. Dev., Intel-
lectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, ST/CTC/SER.A/24 (1993) [hereinafter
Foreign Direct Investment]; accord Edson Kenji Kondo, Patent Laws and Foreign Direct Invest-
ment: An Empirical Investigation, UMI Dissertation Services (May 1994).
18. Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 17, at 3-4.
[Vol. 72:385
THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT
granted high levels of IPRs protection (e.g., Nigeria) have not at-
tracted higher levels of FDI than other similarly situated countries.
The arguments suggesting that higher levels of IPRs protection
will benefit the developing countries are logical. They may in small or
large part be correct. But the train of logic is not supported by empiri-
cal evidence. 19 More importantly, these arguments capture only a
small part of how IPRs and their globalization might effect economic
development. For example, if a U.S. business refuses to transfer its
manufacturing data to a developing country because that country does
not recognize its patents, and after the developing country agrees to
grant patent protection the U.S. business transfers its technology and
begins to manufacture there, the developing country may experience
an IPRs-related welfare gain. But there are a number of possible sce-
narios under which the local welfare gain may be greater, for example
if a local group had been able to finance the start-up of its own manu-
facturing facility and obtain a reasonably-priced license of the technol-
ogy. It is not just a question of whether technology will be
transferred, but under what conditions.
There remains considerable uncertainty concerning the impact of
the TRIPS Agreement on global economic development. 20 The past
five years have seen an increased attention by economists to the rela-
tionship between IPRs and international economic development, and
IPRs and trade.21 While it is clear that substantial progress is being
19. See, e.g., Keith E. Maskus, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, in COMMISSION OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EUROPEAN ECONOMY, No. 52, at 172 (1993), stating:
In truth, there is little systematic evidence that natural market mechanisms for appro-
priating returns on innovation have been eroded and that stronger patents would cor-
rect the situation. This is an unfortunate gap in our understanding of the situation and
leaves unresolved the important empirical question of whether greater protection of
IPRs would call forth substantially more inventive activity. This question lies at the
heart of the debate over international protection of IPRs.
20. Up to and through the 1980s, the relationship between IPRs and international economic
development was the subject of few studies by economists. This scarcity was noted in, for exam-
ple, Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Economic of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT. A
View from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243, 254 (1989). One excellent early study was
EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM (1951).
Among studies that had been done, the absence of empirical referents was striking. The typical
article would read more or less as follows: assume a two-country/two-good world. Assume that
the effects of a trademark are X. If a trademark does X, and X is introduced into a developing
country economy, and assuming that X is as to a developing economy as it is to an industrialized
economy, then mathematical analysis suggests that Y will occur. See, for example, M.L. Burn-
stein, Diffusion of Knowledged-Based Products: Application to Developing Economies, 22 ECoN.
INOUIRY 612 (1984), with reference to patents. Though these studies may well have had value in
suggesting areas where empirical research would be valuable, they did not appear to provide a
solid foundation for international IPRs policy planning.
21. Primo Braga and Fink's contribution to this Symposium reviews these studies in detail.
See Primo Braga & Fink, supra note 5, at 446-53; see also Maskus, supra note 19, at 157.
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made in collecting empirical data and refining tools of analysis, the
conclusions that have been reached to date only begin to illuminate
the relationship between IPRs and international economic develop-
ment. The contribution by Primo Braga and Fink to this Symposium-
reflects the state of the art in this field, and its authors use care in
offering conclusions. Having reviewed the economics literature con-
cerning the impact of higher levels of IPRs on developing countries,
the authors observe:
This brief review underscores the limitations of normative recom-
mendations concerning changes in the rules for IPRs at world level.
The strengthening of IPRs protection will have different welfare im-
plications depending on the characteristics of each country. Gener-
alizations can only be made if strong assumptions are adopted. For
example, if one assumes that the supply of innovations in the South
(i.e., in the developing world) is rather inelastic and that IPRs re-
gimes are of limited relevance in influencing trade, foreign direct
investment, and technology transfer, then it follows that the
[TRIPS] Agreement is in essence an exercise in rent transfer. A
much more optimistic view of its welfare implications for develop-
ing countries, however, can be put together if the opposite assump-
tions are held.22
Yet in the midst of a sea of theoretical and doctrinal controversy
concerning the nature of IPRs and their potential impact on public
welfare, it may nevertheless be possible to reach consensus at a high
level of abstraction on the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on global
public welfare. The TRIPS Agreement in some undetermined measure
enhances the economic advantages of holders of lPRs capital. It is as if
to say that all holders of $100 capital now have $101. We do not know
what the capital owners will do with their increased assets, or whether
an additional $1 can buy additional market share. Perhaps it might
merely be said that before the TRIPS Agreement the $100 capital was
rather insecure and subject to rapid dissipation, and now it is more
secure. This is still an economic advantage. Perhaps it will be easier
for more persons to accumulate $100 in the future. Perhaps the for-
mation of capital on a global basis has been facilitated. But in any
event, it would seem uncontroversial to suggest that IPRs capital has
been made more secure, and that in this sense the value to its holders
has been increased. This, after all, was the whole point of the TRIPS
negotiations. 23 There is a risk that the higher level of IPRs security
22. Primo Braga & Fink, supra note 5, at 443 (footnotes omitted).
23. IPRs concentration may be exacerbated by more effective systems for the globalization
of IPRs made possible by WIPO-administered conventions like the Patent Cooperation Treaty
("PCT").
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will lead to or embed a stratification and concentration of IPRs own-
ership in OECD country-based enterprises, with public consequences
both in the developing and industrialized countries. Public policy
makers must now earnestly turn to this other side of the TRIPS
equation.
II. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, IPRs CONCENTRATION,
TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION, AND PUBLIC WELFARE
A. The Sources of Concern
1. Technology "Have" and "Have Nots"
Trademarks are used to generate demand for products in devel-
oping and developed markets throughout the world. Patents protect
the innovation embodied in the products being marketed. The en-
tertainment media and software industry are increasingly important
factors in the international economic arena, and the protection af-
forded by copyright has taken on a new importance. Ubiquitous
trademarks, patented technology, and commercially valuable copy-
righted material are preponderantly owned by OECD country-based
enterprises. 24 A comparable ownership allocation applies to invest-
ment capital. 25 As noted earlier, during the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions, OECD country industry groups promoted the idea that higher
levels of IPRs protection would stimulate inventive activity in the de-
veloping countries, and would provide a secure environment which
would encourage FDI and a higher level of technology transfer from
the North to the South. Presumably in consequence, the disparity in
ownership of IPRs between developed and developing countries
would be self-correcting over time. However, neither the occurrence
of this self-correcting effect nor its time frame are certain. If the dis-
24. See, for example, Primo Braga & Fink, supra note 5, at 442 n.8, observing: "By 1982, of
the 200,000 patents awarded by developing countries, for example, 175,000 (87.5%) were
awarded to foreign patentees. For the major developing countries, the share was around 79%."
See also, for example, Maskus, supra note 19, at 157; Carlos A. Primo Braga, Trade-Related
Intellectual Property Issues: The Uruguay Round Agreement and its Economic Implications, in
The Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies (1995) (presented at the World Bank
Conf., Jan. 26-27, 1995); the annual White Paper of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade
and Industry, JETRO, WHITE PAPER ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE: JAPAN 1992 (1992) (discussing
the importance of technological leadership in Japan vis a vis its Asian work-sharing partners)
[hereinafter MITI WHITE PAPER]; and Teresa Riordan, Which Companies Had the Most Patents
in 1994? It Depends on Which Set of Statistics You Believe, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995, at D2
(indicating high concentration of patent grants to large multinational enterprises).
25. See D. Greenaway, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, in EUROPEAN ECONOMY No.
52, at 103, 105 (1993). For example, the "rest of world" outside the OECD in 1988 held 6.3% of
the total world stock of FDI.
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parity in technological expertise and IPRs ownership will not be self-
correcting, or if the time frame for correction is lengthy, is this a con-
cern of the international community?
Assume arguendo that the global economic system is or becomes
sharply divided between technology "have" and "have not" countries.
At least some public policy planners in the United States and Japan
view the maintenance of technological dominance as critical to sus-
tained economic growth in an increasingly competitive international
economy. 26
There are at least two fairly realistic risks that may be associated
with a substantial skewing of the international trading system among
the technological haves and have nots. The first is that the developing
country governments will determine that market opening and the pro-
vision of IPRs protection do not constitute effective pro-growth poli-
cies, and they will revert to import substitution policies and market
closure in order to protect their markets from technologically domi-
nant suppliers. A reversion to import substitution policies would most
likely lead to a replay of the period of stagnant developing country
economic activity such as what occurred from the late 1960s to the
mid-1980s. Market closure and stagnant economic development in
the developing countries impacts not only the directly affected states
and their nationals, but also has negative consequences for OECD
country trade and investment, and for the international financial sys-
tem. The Mexican Peso Crisis of 1994-95 demonstrated the extent to
which global economic markets have become interdependent, and
highlighted the risks associated with such interdependence.
The second potential consequence is the emergence of threats to
security, i.e., minimum public order. If Japan treats the PRC, the Ko-
rean Peninsula, and Southeast Asia as a cheap labor haven, and the
United States treats Mexico and other Latin American countries in a
similar way, antagonistic political relations may result. The United
States is virtually immune from military threat to its territory,27 but
U.S. investments in Latin America (and elsewhere) are not secure
26. The emergence of advanced technology as a key component of economic growth in the
industrialized countries is a major theme of both LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, WHO'S BASHING
WHOM? (1992) and LESTER THUROW, THE COMING CLASH (1992). The MITI WHITE PAPER,
supra note 24, at 103, notes that within Japanese international work-sharing arrangements, the
higher value-added high technology component of manufacturing processes tends to take place
in Japan, while the lower value-added labor intensive components are performed in Southeast
Asian countries. The pursuit of policies of technological dominance, and the pursuit of benign
technology transfer policies, may not be mutually exclusive, but they are facially inconsistent.
27. Though potential terrorist threats to internal security should not be discounted.
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from civil or military capture. Because of its comparatively weaker
military forces and its geographical situation,28 Japan is in a more ten-
uous position than the United States with respect to both its external
investments and its territory.
A pattern of wealth accumulation among the technologically so-
phisticated (e.g., well-educated), and the existence of a disen-
franchised "underclass," is a phenomenon visible in the national
sphere.29 The creation of a schism between rich and poor in the na-
tional sphere has manifested itself in domestic security difficulties. 30
The occurrence of a similar phenomenon on the international plane
can be envisaged, even if not as a "most likely" scenario. The EU has
experienced some significant public order disturbances arising out of
immigration from the poorer developing world. The potential for al-
leviating international minimum public order concerns might justify
attempts by the OECD to prevent the continuation or exacerbation of
a sharp skewing between standards of living in the developed and de-
veloping worlds.
But assume that the international trading system could be divided
among the rich and poor, the technology haves and have nots, for an
indefinite period without threat to the international economic system
as a whole, and without raising minimum public order concerns.
There is nevertheless an important place for humanitarian concern in
the international economic system. From the founding of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") forward, the community
of international economic specialists has maintained a strong bias in
favor of promoting human rights and human dignity through special
attention to the interests of developing countries. There is every indi-
cation among the present generation of international economic spe-
cialists that a strong interest persists in promoting human rights as a
core goal of the international economic system.
2. Technology Concentration in the OECD
The concentration of technological expertise and IPRs ownership
in large-scale OECD enterprises is not exclusively an industrialized
developing country problem (or potential problem). Assuming, argu-
endo, that extending high levels of IPRs protection on a global basis
28. The proximity of Japan to the PRC and North Korea is of more concern from a security
standpoint than the proximity of the United States to Mexico and Canada.
29. See, e.g., JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE CULTURE OF CONTENTMENT (1992).
30. For example, the South Los Angeles riots following the Rodney King verdict and the
proliferation of drug-related violence.
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solidifies the dominant or quasi-dominant position of existing large-
scale enterprises in the global industrial and services sectors, the pat-
tern of concentration will not only exist in the developing countries.
There is a risk that the OECD economies will become more highly
stratified among those enterprises that can afford to incur large-scale
research and development expenses, as well as global advertising ex-
penses, and those that cannot. It seems at least intuitively apparent
that enterprises which achieve scale economies on a global basis, and
penetrate the global consumer market, have significant advantages
over small competitors and potential competitors, at least as far as the
large-scale accumulation of capital is concerned. Would policy makers
be satisfied by a world of personal computers dominated by seven
large multinational producers, if two were Japanese, three were
American, one was Korean, and one was Taiwanese? What if all of
these computers used an operating system licensed by the same com-
pany? What if they all depended on two companies for their
microprocessors? What if all of these producers had become so inno-
vative as a consequence of huge research and development expendi-
tures, and so efficient in production as a consequence of international
work-sharing arrangements (taking advantage of the lowest produc-
tion cost in each country), that it became virtually impossible for a
new producer to enter the international market? Though at the mo-
ment this is a purely speculative exercise, the question is nevertheless
not entirely an esoteric one, as at least some trends toward this result
are evident in the computer industry. The global market in automo-
bile production is one in which the number of producers has been
consistently shrinking through merger activity, and in which capital
barriers to entry have become prohibitive. The basic point is this:
while concentration of capital in the OECD countries may be of great-
est concern to the "have not" developing countries, it is not an en-
tirely moot issue from an OECD public policy perspective.
In the United States and the EU, competition authorities have
long sought to assure that IPRs are not abused.3' Recently, the U.S.
Department of Justice in its IPRs Licensing Guidelines32 has sug-
gested the IPR should be treated as other forms of property-real
31. For a survey of OECD country competition law and practice with respect to IPRs, see
OECD, COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989).
32. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing
of Intellectual Property, 34 I.L.M. 1115 (Apr. 6, 1995) [hereinafter DOJ Guidelines]; see also
OECD, COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989).
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property, for example-in competition law analysis. 33 To paraphrase
the Department of Justice, IPRs are another component of capital,
like money or machinery.34 Capital may be abused in a variety of
different ways for anticompetitive purposes. However, the ownership
of capital is not itself abusive, nor is it evidence of abuse. As with
other forms of capital, so it is with IPRs. In the acts of the IPRs
owner abuse may be found; but the ownership of the IPR itself is
neither evidence of market power, nor certainly of abuse. As the De-
partment of Justice was careful to point out, federal courts in the
United States have not been of one mind on this philosophical per-
spective, some concluding that ownership of IPRs should be equated
with market power.35
The European Union has actively policed against the abuse of
IPRs in the inter-Member, or intra-Union, trade context. There is a
rich history of decisional law from the European Court of Justice, as
well as a history of policy determination by the European Commis-
sion, that places significant limitations on market allocation based on
IPRs.36
In addressing potential IPRs-related concentration problems at
the intra-OECD level, the principal focus of public policy planners
should be on the development and effective application of competi-
tion law rules relating to IPRs. The contributions by Wolfgang Fikent-
scher and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann to this Symposium analyze in
detail some of the important ongoing efforts to improve the interna-
33. See DOJ Guidelines, supra note 32, at 1120 1 2.1.
34. The DOJ Guidelines state:
That is not to say that intellectual property is in all respects the same as any other form
of property. Intellectual property has important characteristics, such as ease of misap-
propriation, that distinguish it from many other forms of property. These characteris-
tics can be taken into account by standard antitrust analysis, however, and do not
require the application of fundamentally different principles.
Id.
35. See id. at 1121 n.10.
36. EU and U.S. policies with respect to importation of goods place on markets with the
consent of IPRs holders is described and analyzed in Frederick M. Abbott (Co-Rapporteur),
First Report to the Committee on International Trade Law of the International Law Association
on the Subject of Parallel Importation, presented at ILA Helsinki Biennial Conf. (Aug. 1996).
The European Court of Justice, from the virtual inception of the European Economic Commu-
nity, has grappled with the question whether Member State IPRs laws may be used to restrict the
free movement of goods and services between the Member States. As a general proposition, the
ECJ has been hostile to prohibitions on parallel importation within the Union, fashioning a
broad "intra-Union exhaustion" rule. With respect to intra-Union exhaustion, see Giuliano
Marenco and Karen Banks, Intellectual Property and the Community Rules on Free Movement:
Discrimination Unearthed, 15 EUR. L. REV. 224, 243-44 (1990) (citing, e.g., Deutsche Gram-
mophon v. Metro (copyright), Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, and Centrafarm v. Winthrop (patent
and trademark)).
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tional competition law framework.37 Of course, if OECD policy-mak-
ers are right, and developing country enterprises that make heavy use
of IPRs become more competitive with similar OECD enterprises, the
potential problem of IPRs concentration in the OECD will be
reduced.
B. Responding to Development-Related Concerns
Uncertainty concerning the long range impact of the TRIPS
Agreement on the developing countries is not an excuse for ignoring
its potential effects. There are a number of useful steps that might be
taken to promote and assure that a balance between the private ad-
vantages accorded to the holders of IPRs and the public interest is
achieved. If it turns out that granting high levels of IPRs protection
provides great benefits to the developing countries, it is doubtful that
measures taken to promote technological development in these coun-
tries will have impeded this result.
1. Filling the Information Gap
A central item on the agenda must be to undertake a comprehen-
sive research program concerning the impact of IPRs ownership on
economic development, as well as to identify patterns of concentra-
tion in the technology and IPRs fields (and the potential effects of
such concentration, if any). Progress in this field of analysis is ham-
pered by the lack of collected empirical data. Economists have made
some recent progress in this area, and the economics profession has
identified this field as one of urgency. Nevertheless, a higher level of
funding and coordination for such activities would certainly be
desirable.
There is a critical need in the IPRs-trade arena to work toward
the creation of a policy-neutral research and analysis source. It may
be that academic economists and social scientists are best suited to
filling this role. Alternatively, perhaps a commission(s) in which re-
searchers with a variety of policy perspectives share the same task
might produce comparatively objective results.
37. See Wolfgang Fikentscher, The Draft International Antitrust Code ("DIAC") in the Con-
text of International Technological Integration, 72 Cn.-KENT L. REV. 533 (1996), and Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for Governments and Private Business: A
"Trade Law Approach" for Linking Trade and Competition in the WTO. 72 CIn.-KENr L. REV.
545, 554-58 (1996).
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2. Institutional Responses
Financial resources are at the heart of the technology/IPRs dis-
parity problem. Technology that is owned by OECD-based enter-
prises can often be licensed, but not cost-free. Developing country
students can be trained at OECD institutions of higher learning, but
at considerable expense. OECD-based enterprises that develop and
own IPRs resources are not charitable institutions, and public plan-
ners should not expect them to donate their resources. A lack of
available capital at the global institutional level must be taken into
account as a significant constraint on any program to transfer techno-
logical resources to, or to create technological resources in, the devel-
oping countries.
Furthermore, the global political situation is not ripe for the crea-
tion of an international technology development and transfer-related
institution on a large scale, e.g., WIPO transformed into a global tech-
nology world bank. With most OECD countries experiencing what
national politicians attack as "cheap-developing-country-labor-in-
duced-underemployment," to suggest that these same politicians
should undertake to provide funds to make developing country enter-
prises more competitive with the OECD industrial base would be
unrealistic.
In light of the foregoing constraints, at least five potential re-
sponses to the disparity between the technology "have" and "have
not" countries are likely to occur, or may be recommended. These
are: (1) passive resistance to TRIPS Agreement-based changes by de-
veloping countries; (2) an international antitrust approach; (3) work
by non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"); (4) the use of domes-
tic tax policy to balance IPRs ownership and the public interest; and
(5) the development and implementation of international and regional
industrial policy programs.
a. Passive resistance
Perhaps the most likely course of the developing countries with
respect to the TRIPS Agreement will be a continuation of past prac-
tices. They will continue to resist changes to their IPRs laws, and
when they do make changes, they will be slow to enforce them in
favor of foreign enterprises. To the extent that the TRIPS Agreement
may adversely affect the economic interests of developing countries,
passive resistance of this type may under present financial circum-
stances be the most likely countermechanism.
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b. International antitrust/competition law
Effective policing of the international economic system against
IPRs-related competitive abuses through the use of competition laws
would be consistent with present governmental approaches to IPRs
and the threat of concentration. The TRIPS Agreement permits
Member governments to police against the abuse of IPRs within their
own national competition law frameworks. 38 Members are politely
encouraged to share information, 39 and the Agreement permits the
granting by Members of compulsory licenses to remedy anticompeti-
tive abuses of IPRs.40 On the other hand, the TRIPS Agreement does
not obligate its Members to police against IPRs-related competitive
abuses.
Developing countries have a particular interest in the potential
application of competition rules with respect to IPRs. Developing
markets tend to be less competitive than more highly developed mar-
kets in the general market economy environment. This situation
arises from a combination of factors affecting developing markets, in-
cluding the relative absence of effective rule-making and enforcement
structures, the presence of smaller numbers of major market partici-
pants, concentrations of ownership, and more active government par-
ticipation as market actor.
There obviously remains much work to be done in constructing
an effective international system for protecting against abuses in the
IPRs domain. As already noted, the range of activities among govern-
ments and scholars regarding efforts to coordinate, if not harmonize,
competition law at the international level is extensive. Most likely,
this work will proceed through the gradual refinement of competition
rules in the TRIPS Agreement, and through a combination of more
general programs, within the WTO framework and elsewhere. Special
attention will need to be directed to the unique problems faced by
developing countries in the effective application of competition rules.
Assistance by OECD competition offices in the establishment and op-
eration of developing country competition offices may be very desira-
ble, and might be modeled on the assistance programs operated by
WIPO and national/regional IP offices in favor of developing
countries.
38. See TRIPS Agreement art. 40:1-2. An illustrative list of practices refers to "exclusive
grantback conditions, conditions preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licens-
ing." Id. art. 40:3.
39. See id.
40. See id. art. 31(k)-(i).
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c. Non-governmental organizations
NGOs have made important contributions in the field of environ-
mental policy and international trade. NGOs have been less active, or
at least less visible and successful, with respect to other aspects of in-
ternational economic policy. With a more substantial presence in the
international IPRs field, NGOs could make important contributions in
favor of developing countries.
d. IPRs-related tax policy
The TRIPS Agreement does not require that patents, trade-
marks, copyrights, or other forms of IPRs protection be granted or
maintained on a tax free basis.41 Patent holders, for example, could
be required to pay annual taxes based on revenues received from sales
of patented products or from patent licenses.
The main limitation on an IPRs-based tax is the national treat-
ment principle as set forth in TRIPS Agreement Article 3. This article
requires each Member to treat nationals of other Members no less
favorably "with regard to the protection of intellectual property" than
it treats its own nationals. Footnote 3 to Article 3 makes clear that the
imposition of taxes would be subject to the national treatment princi-
ple. It provides that "protection shall include matters affecting the
availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance and enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights .... "42 Therefore, in applying IPRs-based taxes
to OECD-based enterprises, developing countries must also apply
IPRs-based taxes to their own enterprises. In theory, this might dis-
courage innovation by domestic enterprises.
There are, however, two reasons why the national treatment prin-
ciple should not be an insurmountable obstacle to the use of IPRs-
based taxes to balance IPRs-based wealth. First, if the preponderance
of industry-related IPRs in a developing economy are owned by
OECD-based enterprises, 43 tax burdens will fall disproportionately on
these enterprises. Second, under express and customary GATT rules
with respect to the GATT Article III (national treatment), the re-
41. Taxes are an ordinary incidence of property ownership, and are not expressly precluded
by the TRIPS Agreement. The GATT 1994 accepts that national governments will impose taxes
with respect to the production and sale of goods. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. III.
42. See TRIPS Agreement art. 3. Application of Article 3 by the developing countries is
not subject to transition arrangements, and so applies one year following January 1, 1995. See
TRIPS Agreement art. 65.
43. The nationality of ownership is an empirical issue which, at least in the fields of patents
and trademarks, can be answered by a search of local patent and trademark office records.
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quirement that governments treat domestic and imported products on
an equivalent basis applies to "like products." Although the "like
products" language of GATT Article III is not found in TRIPS Agree-
ment Article 3, there is nothing in the TRIPS Agreement language
that would preclude a government from imposing different rates ,of
taxation on the maintenance of IPRs with respect to different classes
of products. Thus, pharmaceutical product patent maintenance taxes
might be different than mechanical engineering patent maintenance
taxes.
It is important to stress that taxation mechanisms are subtle in-
struments. The goal of any IPRs-related tax policy must be to seek a
responsible balance between ownership of innovation and general
economic welfare. IPRs-related tax policy must not be confiscatory.
IPRs-based taxes would transfer wealth from IPRs holders through
governments to the public. There is no assurance that governments
will pursue thoughtful public planning any more than there is assur-
ance that private enterprises will do so. It cannot therefore be sug-
gested that IPRs-based taxes are a panacea for the imbalance in
technology ownership among OECD and developing country enter-
prises. Taxes may, however, prove at least to be a bargaining lever by
which the developing countries can obtain a higher level of coopera-
tion from OECD-based enterprises." IPRs-based taxes appear con-
sistent with Article 7, "Objectives," of the TRIPS Agreement, which
provides:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and
to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual ad-
vantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a
manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance
of rights and obligations.4 5
It is also worth noting that IPRs-based taxes might be used in the
OECD countries to balance the rights of IPRs holders and the public.
e. International industrial policy
Industrial policy refers to governmental efforts to direct private
resources toward particular social goals. The U.S. government fre-
quently employs industrial policy, for example, to promote the devel-
opment of military technologies. The Japanese government employs
44. Optimally, the developing countries would seek to coordinate their IPRs-related tax
policies so as to avoid presenting private enterprises with the opportunity to bargain over condi-
tions of taxation.
45. TRIPS Agreement art. 7.
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industrial policy to maintain high levels of stable employment. All
other things being equal, the operation of the free market is prefera-
ble to industrial policy because recourse to industrial policy may ad-
versely affect individual interests.46  Nevertheless, there are
circumstances under which the operation of the free market may be
less than optimal from a social welfare perspective.
The TRIPS Agreement places an obligation on developed coun-
try Members to "provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in
their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging tech-
nology transfer to least developed country Members in order to en-
able them to create a sound and viable technological base. '47
There are many mechanisms by which the international commu-
nity could encourage the transfer of technology resources to develop-
ing countries. World Bank loans could be made available for the
training of developing country engineers in OECD educational insti-
tutions. A multilateral investment agreement could obligate or en-
courage investing enterprises to hire and train local engineers.
International financial institutions in cooperation with developing
country governments could finance joint research and development
efforts designed to maximize local resources. As earlier observed, in-
ternational industrial policy directed at enhancing developing country
technological capability is wishful thinking in the absence of financial
resources. Developing countries may therefore want to explore their
own pooling of financial resources, just as OECD-based enterprises
pool their resources in research and development ("R&D") joint
ventures. 48
f Regional integration and industrial policy
The EU is following this path in its various plans for the develop-
ment of the European technological infrastructure. Title XV of the
EC Treaty (as amended by the Maastricht Treaty) is wholly devoted to
a program of technology-related industrial policy.49 The developing
countries may well seek to accomplish the goal of pursuing a techno-
logical balance with the OECD by emulating the EU regional effort in
46. See Frederick M. Abbott, Trade and Democratic Values, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 9
(1993), for more detail on this theme.
47. TRIPS Agreement art. 66:2.
48. International agencies such as WIPO might assist in such enterprises.
49. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 130f-130p, 1992 O.J.
(C 224) 1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992); see, e.g., THE FINAL REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MISSION ON RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE LESS FAVORED REGIONS
OF THE COMMUNITY (STRIDE) (1987).
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its research and technological development programs. The Mercosur
countries, for example, might seek in their cooperation negotiations
with the EU to build ties between Mercosur and EU R&D programs.
Similarly, the Andean Pact, which experienced difficulties with the
relatively confiscatory technology transfer approach of Decisions 84
and 85, might emphasize a redirection to a regional R&D develop-
ment program.50
A regional institutional approach to technological development,
coupled with other approaches, may over the next decades begin to
bring into balance the state of technological development in the
OECD and developing countries.
3. The Information Revolution as a Non-Institutional
Development
The changes to patterns of economic development that may be
brought about as a consequence of the information revolution are ex-
ceedingly difficult to foresee or predict. What may be observed at the
present is that a basic telephone connection and a fairly inexpensive
computer can be used to link an individual at virtually any point on
the globe to a vast collection of data and human resources. The inter-
national system for the protection of IPRs is in various measures
designed to restrict open access to data that may be useful in produc-
ing goods and services, particularly as such production may conflict
with the rights of patent holders. Yet the present proliferation of in-
formation, scientific and otherwise, is so extensive that its impact on
the distribution and use of knowledge-based resources may be great,
even in light of existing IPRs restrictions. The potential results cannot
readily be extrapolated from experience.
If the Internet or comparable systems of information transfer re-
main as open as at present, it may be exceedingly difficult for present
50. The Andean Pact countries attempted in the mid-1970s to restructure the international
IPRs balance by the adoption of Decisions 84 and 85. See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Bar-
gaining Power and Strategy in the Foreign Investment Process: A Current Andean Code Analysis,
3 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 319, 346-51 (1975). These Decisions were intended to severely
restrict the ability of foreign IPRs-owners to establish and transfer income based on IPRs owner-
ship, and included significant restrictions on IPRs ownership. The Andean Pact countries have
gradually adopted a more balanced approach to their technology sectors, and have been moving
towards compliance with TRIPS Agreement standards. See Andean Group: Commission Deci-
sion 313-Common Code on Intellectual Property, 32 I.L.M. 180 (1993); Colombia's Granting of
Drug Patents Raises Questions on Andean Pact Rules, Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily (BNA) (Aug. 31,
1994); Intellectual Property in Andean Accord Worries U.S. Industry, USTR Official Says, 10 Int'l
Tr. Rep. (BNA) 427 (Mar. 10, 1993). The Andean Pact historical progression appears to demon-
strate the importance of and difficulties in balancing the interests of IPRs owners and the public,
and the Andean Pact effort in the technology and IPRs field is worthy of close study.
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holders of knowledge-based wealth to exercise control over their
knowledge base. Large-scale private investments in research and de-
velopment may become international public goods. Moreover, even if
holders of IPRs continue to exercise control over technological re-
sources, second-best technologies (e.g., those that have fallen outside
patent protection) may be very useful in developing country markets.
It must be acknowledged that access to technology alone may not suf-
fice in the absence of investment capital. In this regard, international
institutions such as the World Bank may continue to play a substantial
role, at least in periods of initial capital formation in developing econ-
omies. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the international institu-
tional response to the problem of disparities in the ownership of IPRs-
based wealth may be in the process of becoming less important-with
one very significant proviso. That proviso, of course, is that interna-
tional institutions do not respond to the information revolution by at-
tempting to crush it.
4. Synthesis
The optimal approach to creating and maintaining an equitable
balance in the international IPRs system will likely involve a combina-
tion of approaches. The goal of the international IPRs system should
be to promote innovation, while protecting against the continuation
and exacerbation of a stark division of the global economic system
among the technological haves and have nots. The importance of the
relationship between IPRs and economic development is apparent.
Long delays in implementing policies in favor of reducing disparities
in knowledge-based wealth seem likely-though not certain-to exac-
erbate long term problems. Developments in technology itself-em-
bodied in the information revolution-may greatly assist in equalizing
the distribution of technology. Initial capital formation may neverthe-
less remain an obstacle to putting technology to use. Disputes will
certainly arise as to the proper means of distributing the fruits of the
information revolution. Herein lies the role of the public policy plan-
ner - promoting a balance between highly useful private capital for-
mation and the general social welfare of humankind.
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